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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

19 September 1955

MEMORANDUM TO: Mr. Jerome D. Fenton
Chairman, USCIB Special Committee

SUBJECT : Report and Recommendations on Procedures
Implementing USCIB Directive #5.

1. Pre-access Checking and Background Investigations.

The Central Intelligence Agency requires a complete background investigation, including National Agency checks, on all applicants prior to their entrance on duty. This is regardless of whether or not they may eventually have a "need to know" and be cleared for Comint. However, in those cases where it is evident that the applicant will either certainly or probably occupy a position requiring Comint clearance, special measures are taken to insure that such applicant meets the criteria set forth in USCIB #5, and in such cases, if the applicant does not fully meet this criteria, he or she is either refused employment or, such as in cases where foreign connections are a problem, assigned other duties if E. O. 10450 and CIA own criteria and operational need will justify.

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In clearance for Comint for either applicants or employees alike, the entire investigation is specifically reviewed to insure compliance with USCIB #5, as well as E. O. 10450 and CIA's own criteria. In cases where there is any departure from USCIB #5 in so far as foreign connections are concerned, the matter is submitted to the Assistant Director in charge of Comint matters and waivers may be granted by him through his own Security Officer.

In addition, since 1948-49, all persons being considered for Comint have been required to take a security interview in which the polygraph is used to verify statements as to major loyalty or security risk matters.

Actually, all applicants have for some time been asked to volunteer for a polygraph interview because of the need in the unusually sensitive work of this Agency to take the most stringent security precautions in the national interest. Our applicants and employees have realized this unusual necessity and their spirit of cooperation and willingness have been most heartening. In over 20,000 cases, only six persons have failed to volunteer for this interview.

An important part of our investigative and clearance procedure is that all persons regardless of present or past rank or position, are required to be fully investigated and asked to take the polygraph.

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In closing this part of our report, it would be wrong to leave the impression or inference that this Agency considers its investigative and clearance practices to be perfect.

There are definite limitations in cost and in time to meet our investigative load. This is particularly a problem when faced with the need to fully clear before the applicant comes on duty. We are and should continue to use every means to improve the scope and quality of our coverage.

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2. Methods of supervision, control, education and inspection.

In the CIA, the operational and security control of Comint is delegated by the Director to an Assistant Director. Within this office, there is a Security Branch composed of six professional security officers provided by the Director of Security of the Agency. Under the Command of the Assistant Director and the technical and policy guidance of the Director of Security, the Chief of the Security Branch exercises direct continual supervision, control, education, and inspection of Comint personnel, Comint areas and Comint operations. This office and all its personnel come, of course, under the overall personnel security, physical security and policy controls of the Director of Security. The Director of Security exercises the counter-intelligence function as well. However, the designation of a Security Branch within the Comint Area permits the implementation of the following procedures:

a. Supervision and control:

All Comint within CIA is handled in physically segregated sections of our buildings designated Comint Restricted Areas, controlled by turnstiles and special receptionists, within which only Comint cleared and indoctrinated individuals are permitted access. (An exception is made in the case of maintenance personnel such as char force, carpenters, telephone men, etc., who must perform duties in the area--they are admitted only under escort after the area has been completely secured by locking all classified material in combination-lock safe cabinets.) All personnel within a Comint Restricted Area are badged with special badges which evidence the holders' Comint cleared status. Cleared personnel are indoctrinated in Comint through attending a lecture, which normally takes an hour and includes the reading of a Comint indoctrination manual, and execute a special Comint oath before a notary public. Also, prior to indoctrinating an individual who has been ascertained Comint clearable through the investigative and interrogation procedures heretofore described, a detailed "desk audit" is performed on his proposed assignment to determine that a Comint need-to-know exists, with every effort being made to keep the number of indoctrinated persons to a minimum.

b. Security education and inspection:

In 1954 we initiated the practice of having all Comint

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indoctrinated individuals, in groups of 50, attend a refresher security lecture on Comint with ample time being allowed for questions at the conclusion of the prepared talk. This is being continued on an annual basis. Also, all personnel going on TDY and PCS duty, or extended leave, are given security briefings. In addition, we have now established procedures whereby on the fifth anniversary date of each individual's indoctrination into Comint he will submit an up-to-date Personal History statement which will be reviewed for reinvestigation action.

In closing this part of the report, the undersigned wishes to point out that he believes this Agency can and should reduce the numbers of persons having access to Comint. It is difficult for any Security Officer to fully assess the "need to know" and in this respect, we must take the views of the operating officials. However, both operating officials and security officers should receive more pressure from USCIB to more carefully restrict the need to know and to more clearly define categories of clearance. In this respect, and from a security standpoint we believe that in this Agency (a consumer agency), the physical security restrictions do in fact increase the number of persons requiring clearance. The fact that only a Comint badged person can enter a restricted area in which both Comint and other source material is handled, even though such person is not himself really involved in Comint, automatically greatly increases the number of clearances. I feel the same thing obtains in other Agencies. The matter of properly balancing physical security procedures is now under study in this Agency.

3. Means by which the potential damage of a faulty employee can be minimized.

This is indeed a thorny problem. The strict application of "need to know" even within the Comint area is obvious but because of the mass of material and the need to analyze and research it, is difficult to enforce. Travel restrictions, controls, and continuing security education are also obvious. However, assuming, and we must so assume, that "faulty employees" do exist, we can only gear our procedures to indoctrinate not only security officers but all Comint persons to be aware, and to observe and find out these faulty employees. This includes on the part of security officers, keeping personnel security files "alive", counter-intelligence research, and other security supervision. On the part of supervisors and operational Comint cleared persons, it requires careful management, leadership and observation and testing of employees.

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4. Conclusions as to present USCIB standards and practices.

a. The USCIB itself needs continuing security guidance by a highly qualified and full time security officer or officers. The appointment of the present committee indicates this need. This is not intended to interfere with or take the place of the security functions of the various member agencies, but rather to better coordinate their efforts.

b. Comint operating officials are not sufficiently aware of indications of security compromise and do not report same with the necessary leads to the appropriate security officers.

c. In "waivers" to clearance standards now permitted to USCIB itself, this Agency feels that the members of the board are not professionally qualified to vote thereon without direct security advice. (See a. above.)

d. Investigation and clearance standards are not adequate in that they fail to properly consider or to require investigation concerning associates of persons having access to Comint.

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f. Investigative and Clearance Standards do not provide for periodic security interviews concerning the present or past activities of a Comint cleared person. (This might or might not include the polygraph, according to the policy of the particular Agency.)

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h. It is unwise from a security standpoint except in most unusual cases, to waive investigations of officers or civil employees based on ten years service, or of any civil appointment by the President.

5. Recommendations:

a. The USCIB should employ a full time and highly qualified

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professional security officer to advise, guide and coordinate security matters and policies in the Comint field.

b. The USCIB must impress upon its members that Comint operating officials must keep their appropriate security officers more completely informed of indications of Comint compromise and pass to the security officers the necessary investigative or counter-intelligence leads.

c. No waiver to a clearance standard by either the Board itself or a Board member should be granted until the research and advice of the appropriate security officer has been received.

d. Investigation and Clearance Standards should be amended to include consideration of associates and also neighborhood investigation.

e. Investigation and Clearance Standards should be reworded to include development of information concerning persons whose family or associates are or might be foreign government officials, whether such governments are friendly or not. ?

f. Member agencies or departments should be required to conduct periodic personnel security interviews of all Comint cleared persons. (Either with or without the polygraph.)

g. Comint member agencies should be prepared to use the polygraph at least on persons strongly suspect, and in any case when the national interest demands, the fullest verification by a security interview. (This is not intended to recommend the habitual use of the polygraph in clearance, nor does it recommend against such use.) It is pointed out that even the occasional use of a polygraph must be done only by highly trained polygraph operators who have operated in the security rather than the criminal field.

h. The "10 year rule" should be dropped.

i. The USCIB should be briefed by the Chairman of this Committee that the "Security Job" is more than just initially investigating and clearing persons for Comint. They should be urged to give their security officers the funds and the professionally trained persons

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to continually review, research, monitor, and train all Comint persons. The Board should be impressed with the need for continuing sensible and practical counter-intelligence supervision of Comint cleared persons.

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Acting Director of Security

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